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The U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate have passed separate comprehensive health reform bills, but enactment of a final law remains uncertain. Last year, 
we reported on the economic implications for the nation and 
individual states if the health reform effort were to fail. In this 
paper, we update our earlier national analyses. We present new 
findings on the composition of the uninsured in 2020 without 
reform, the offers of health benefits by employers, and the 
increase in costs to different payers. 
This report makes clear that the cost of failure would be high 
and the status quo is probably unsustainable. The analysis 
shows that if federal reform efforts fail, over the next decade, 
the percent of the population that is uninsured will increase, 
employer-sponsored coverage will continue to erode, spending  
on public programs will balloon, and individual and family  
out-of-pocket costs will rise.
Using the Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy Simulation 
Model, we examined the effects of maintaining the status quo  
on coverage and costs for three scenarios:
1.  Worst case — slow growth in incomes and continuing high 
growth rates for health care costs;
2.  Intermediate case — somewhat faster growth in incomes, 
but a lower growth rate for health care costs;
3.  Best case — full employment, faster income growth, and 
even slower growth in health care costs.
Under any scenario, the analysis shows a tremendous economic 
strain on individuals and employers of all sizes. While all income 
levels would be affected, middle-income families would be 
hardest hit. Within 10 years, under the worst-case scenario,  
we estimate that:
  »  The number of uninsured Americans would increase 
from 49.4 million in 2010 to 59.7 million in 2015 and 67.6 
million in 2020. If states were to cut back eligibility for public 
coverage or make the enrollment process more difficult,  
the number of uninsured would be even higher. Even in  
the best case, the number of uninsured would rise to 57.9 
million in 2020.
  »  A larger share of the uninsured would come from 
middle- and higher-income families. The share of the 
uninsured from families with incomes higher than 200 
percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) would rise from  
44 percent to 56 percent in 2020.
  »  Premiums would become increasingly expensive for 
employers and their workers. Premiums for both single 
and family policies would more than double by 2020, 
increasing from $4,800 to $10,300 for single policies and 
from $12,100 to $25,600 for family policies. Even in the 
best case, single premiums would rise to $7,800 and family 
premiums would rise to $19,500 by 2020, increasing much 
faster than incomes.
  »  Offers of coverage would fall significantly for workers 
in small and medium firms. Small firm workers would see 
offer rates almost cut in half, dropping from 41 percent to 
23 percent in 2020. Workers in medium-size firms would see 
offer rates fall from 90 percent to 75 percent. Overall, the rate 
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of employer sponsored insurance coverage would fall from 
56 percent in 2010 to 48 percent of nonelderly Americans in 
2020. Even in the best case, the rate of employer sponsored 
insurance coverage would fall to 53 percent in 2020.
  »  Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP) enrollment and costs would increase 
substantially. Enrollment would increase from 45.4 million 
in 2010 to 58.2 million in 2020, an increase of 12.8 million 
nonelderly Americans. Medicaid and CHIP spending for the 
nonelderly would increase from $278 billion in 2010 to $576 
billion in 2020, an increase of 108 percent. Even in the best 
case, spending would increase by 59 percent to $442 billion 
in 2020.
  »  Employers would see large increases in premium 
costs. Employer premium spending would increase from 
$430 billion in 2010 to $851 billion in 2020, a 98 percent 
increase. Even in the best case, employer premium spending 
would increase by 67 percent in ten years. These increases 
would be even higher if employer coverage rates were to hold 
steady over this period rather than decline as predicted.
  »  Uncompensated care costs would more than double. 
The cost of uncompensated care would increase from $64 
billion in 2010 to $140 billion in 2020. In the best case, the 
cost of uncompensated care would increase by 74 percent and 
total $111 billion in 2020. Together with increased spending 
on Medicaid and CHIP, this would mean higher federal, state, 
and local taxes even without reform.
  »  Health care costs paid directly by families would 
increase significantly. Individual and family spending on 
premiums and out-of-pocket health care costs would increase 
from $315 billion in 2010 to $564 billion in 2020. In the best 
case, these costs would rise to $471 billion by 2020.
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The U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate have passed separate comprehensive health reform bills, but enactment of a final law remains uncertain.1 Last year, 
we reported on the economic implications for the nation and 
individual states if the health reform effort were to fail.2, 3 We 
estimated changes in private and public coverage and the number 
of uninsured. Further, we estimated the increase in spending 
by businesses, individuals, and government. In this paper, we 
update our earlier national analyses. We present new findings on 
the composition of the uninsured in 2020 without reform, the 
offers of health benefits by employers, and the increase in costs 
to different payers. 
In previous reports, we showed that health care costs, health 
insurance premiums, and out-of-pocket health spending were 
likely to continue to grow in the absence of reform. There is 
evidence of deceleration of cost growth because of the recession, 
though there have also been reports of substantial premium 
increases. As the economy improves, there is reason to believe 
that the cost to employers, individuals, and families will 
continue to increase at rates similar to those we’ve experienced 
in recent years. Historically and in long-term projections by the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), health costs 
tend to rise two percentage points faster than gross domestic 
product (GDP). 
To the extent health care costs and premiums grow faster than 
incomes, employers will be less likely to offer coverage and 
individuals will be less likely to take up coverage when offered. 
Nongroup coverage will fall as well. Those eligible for Medicaid 
and CHIP will be more likely to enroll due to increasing 
premiums and out-of-pocket health care costs in private 
insurance and declining employer insurance coverage. Continued 
increases in income inequality will also lead to greater Medicaid 
enrollment as more people fall below eligibility thresholds. 
Greater public program enrollment will increase federal and  
state spending. The decline in employer-sponsored insurance 
(ESI) will result in an increase in the number of uninsured. 
This will mean increases in the amount of uncompensated care 
(medical care received by the uninsured and not paid for by 
themselves, including donated care and bad debt) and associated 
spending by state and local governments for those without 
coverage.4 The end result is that there are likely to be significant 
changes in the distribution of health insurance coverage and 
increases in spending both privately and publicly. 
In this paper, we use the Health Insurance Policy Simulation 
Model (HIPSM) to estimate the likely changes in coverage and 
health care costs that will occur nationally from 2010 to 2020  
in the absence of health insurance coverage reform and 
measures to restrain cost growth. We make estimates under three 
alternative scenarios, which vary assumptions about health care 
costs and premium growth as well as unemployment, income 
growth, and changes in income inequality for 2015 and 2020.5 
We asked the following questions:
1)   How many people will have employer-sponsored insurance 
in 2015 and 2020? What will happen to employer spending 
on health insurance premiums? To what extent will workers 
continue to have access to health benefits through their jobs?
2)   How many people will obtain coverage under Medicaid 
given changes in incomes, health care costs, and declines 
in employer coverage? How much will spending on public 
insurance (e.g. Medicaid and CHIP) increase?
3)   How many people will be uninsured in 2015 and 2020?  
How will the cost of uncompensated care change over time 
given changes in the number of uninsured?
Introduction
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4)   What will the composition of the uninsured look like in  
ten years compared to now if health reform fails in terms  
of income, age, and health status?
Data and Methods
HIPSM models the behavior of employers and individuals 
and their decisions to offer and take up coverage. The model 
is designed to show the impact of policy changes on firms’ 
decisions to offer coverage, individuals’ decisions to leave current 
private coverage and enroll in Medicaid, and decisions by the 
uninsured to take up new coverage when eligible. The model uses 
data from several national data sets. It relies primarily on 2004 
data from the 2005 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual 
Social and Economic Supplement, but data from several other 
surveys are matched to the CPS. The model includes a detailed 
simulation of Medicaid eligibility and enrollment, including 
the most important eligibility rules for each state. In the model, 
we also adjust for the undercount of Medicaid on the CPS. The 
behavioral effects in the model are calibrated to findings in the 
empirical economics literature.6 
To obtain a current baseline, we grow the coverage estimates 
from 2004 to 2008 given actual changes in coverage and 
population growth between 2004 and 2008 as measured by the 
CPS. Then to reflect worsening economic conditions between 
2008 and 2010 we apply estimates from Holahan and Garrett to 
estimate the impact of higher unemployment rates on changes 
in health insurance coverage over that period.7 We use new 
estimates of health care cost growth from the CMS Office of the 
Actuary.8 The effects of recent updates are modest, but they limit 
comparability of these results to results from the earlier papers. 
In implementing the growth rate assumptions described below 
within HIPSM, we use the model to generate behavioral 
responses to the cumulative amount of health care cost growth, 
net of income growth, that is assumed to occur between 2010 
and 2015 and 2020. This rise in the relative price of health care 
and health insurance premiums is modeled as a “reform” within 
the baseline year. As private health insurance premiums rise, 
coverage becomes less affordable and demand falls. Fewer firms 
offer coverage and fewer workers take up their ESI offers. Fewer 
individuals purchase nongroup coverage. Those who are eligible 
for Medicaid or CHIP become more likely to enroll. More people 
become uninsured. Given these behavioral responses, we then 
age the population to 2015 and 2020 by making adjustments to 
the weights of the observations in the HIPSM output file. The 
reweighting adjustments take into account the assumptions for 
changes in employment, incomes, offer rates, and changes in  
the population by age and gender cells. Further description of 
the model and methods is presented in Health Reform: The Cost 
of Failure.9 
The Three Alternative Scenarios
We used three alternative scenarios to project changes in health 
care costs and coverage between 2010 and 2015. These are based 
on a series of assumptions that are shown in the top panel of 
Table 1. The worst case assumes that the unemployment rate 
does not return to full employment levels by 2015, that income 
growth is slow, and that health care costs will grow somewhat 
faster than projected by CMS actuaries. We also assume in the 
worst and intermediate cases that firm offer rates fall—a factor 
seen in the prior recession, which has the effect of lowering 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
at end of 
period 
Employment 
rate at end 
of period
Income 
growth 
(average  
annual 
growth)
CPI
(average  
annual 
growth)
Medicaid 
health care 
spending 
per capita 
(average  
annual 
growth)
Private 
health 
spending 
per capita 
(average  
annual 
growth)
Private 
premiums 
(average  
annual 
growth)
Out-of-
pocket 
health care 
costs  
(average  
annual 
growth)
Additional 
decline in 
ESI offer 
rate due to 
recession
2010 to 2015
Scenario 1 (Worst): 7.1% 61.2% 1.0% 2.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 3.5% Yes
Scenario 2 (Intermediate): 6.1 62.0 1.5 2.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 3.0 Yes
Scenario 3 (Best): 5.1 62.8 2.0 2.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 2.5 No
2015 to 2020
Scenario 1 (Worst): 5.1 62.8 1.5 2.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 3.5 No
Scenario 2 (Intermediate): 5.1 62.8 2.0 2.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 3.0 No
Scenario 3 (Best): 5.1 62.8 2.5 2.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 2.5 No
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
Table 1: Growth Rate Assumptions Under Each of Three Scenarios, by 5-Year Period
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employer coverage. The best case assumes that unemployment 
rates return to approximately full employment, that income 
growth is faster, that health care costs grow at slower rates, and 
that there is no additional decline in firm offer rates due to the 
recession. The intermediate case assumes that unemployment 
rates continue to be relatively high and that incomes and health 
care costs grow at rates between the worst and best case. 
We make a similar set of assumptions between 2015 and 2020 
(bottom panel of Table 1). In general, unemployment rates 
are assumed to be lower and income growth faster. Otherwise 
the forecasts for changes in general inflation and health care 
spending are the same between the two periods. For the full  
ten year period in each scenario, we assume that the long-
standing trend of increased income inequality will continue.  
The growth rates are based on forecasts made by the 
Congressional Budget Office, CMS, the Blue Chip consensus 
forecasts, and Economy.com.10 
Changes in Coverage
Table 2 shows the projected number of people with each type of 
health insurance and the number of uninsured in 2010, 2015, and 
2020 under each of the three scenarios. Over time, in the absence 
of reform, more people will be uninsured or have public coverage 
and fewer will be covered through private insurance. In particular: 
  »  The number of uninsured will rise. In the worst case, the 
number of uninsured Americans would increase from 49.4 
million in 2010 to 59.7 million in 2015 and to 67.6 million in 
2020. Nearly one in four Americans under age 65 would be 
uninsured in 2020. In the best case, the number of uninsured 
grows to to 54.0 million in 2015 and 57.9 million in 2020, 
approximately one in five Americans under age 65. All of 
these estimates assume that states would continue to maintain 
current eligibility levels for public coverage. If they were to cut 
back eligibility or make the enrollment process more difficult, 
the number of uninsured would be even higher. 
2010 2015 2020
N % N % N %
Worst Case
ESI 150.2 55.9% 143.4 51.8% 137.6 48.3%
Non-Group 14.8 5.5% 12.9 4.6% 12.2 4.3%
Medicaid 45.4 16.9% 51.8 18.7% 58.2 20.4%
Medicare 4.5 1.7% 4.6 1.7% 4.7 1.7%
Other 4.3 1.6% 4.4 1.6% 4.5 1.6%
Uninsured 49.4 18.4% 59.7 21.6% 67.6 23.7%
Total 268.7 100.0% 276.9 100.0% 284.8 100.0%
Intermediate Case
ESI 150.2 55.9% 146.7 53.0% 144.5 50.8%
Non-Group 14.8 5.5% 13.1 4.7% 12.7 4.5%
Medicaid 45.4 16.9% 50.7 18.3% 55.9 19.6%
Medicare 4.5 1.7% 4.6 1.6% 4.6 1.6%
Other 4.3 1.6% 4.4 1.6% 4.5 1.6%
Uninsured 49.4 18.4% 57.5 20.7% 62.5 21.9%
Total 268.7 100.0% 276.9 100.0% 284.8 100.0%
Best Case
ESI 150.2 55.9% 150.4 54.3% 151.8 53.3%
Non-Group 14.8 5.5% 14.1 5.1% 13.4 4.7%
Medicaid 45.4 16.9% 49.5 17.9% 52.6 18.5%
Medicare 4.5 1.7% 4.6 1.6% 4.5 1.6%
Other 4.3 1.6% 4.4 1.6% 4.5 1.6%
Uninsured 49.4 18.4% 54.0 19.5% 57.9 20.3%
Total 268.7 100.0% 276.9 100.0% 284.8 100.0%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
Table 2: Changes in Coverage Across Years (Nonelderly Population, in Millions)
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  »  The percent of Americans with employer-sponsored. In 
all three scenarios, we see a decline in ESI coverage rates. The 
ESI rate would fall from 56 percent in 2010 to 48 percent in 
2020 in the worst case and to 53 percent in the best case. 
  »  Medicaid and CHIP enrollment will rise. Medicaid and 
CHIP coverage would increase substantially with enrollment 
increasing from 45.4 million in 2010 to 58.2 million in 2020 in 
the worst-case scenario, an increase of 12.8 million nonelderly 
Americans covered under public programs. Even in the best 
case, enrollment would increase by 7.2 million persons.
Changes in Uninsured Rates and the  
Composition of the Uninsured
Table 3 shows the composition of the uninsured population by 
income group, age group, and health status in 2010 and in 2020 
under both the best and worst case scenarios. It also shows the 
percent of individuals who are uninsured within each group. 
We find that:
  »  Middle-income families will be hardest hit by coverage 
declines. In the worst case, the uninsured rate for those in 
families with incomes from 200 to 399 percent of the federal 
poverty level (FPL) would rise by 9 percentage points, from 
19 percent to 28 percent. The number of uninsured people in 
this income group would increase by 7.3 million people. In 
the best case, the uninsured rate would rise to 23 percent.
  »  Higher-income families will also see steep increases 
in rates of uninsurance. The rate of uninsurance for those 
in families with incomes 400 percent of the FPL or more 
would increase from 7 percent in 2010 to 13 percent in the 
worst case and 9 percent in the best case in 2020. 
  »  The rate of uninsurance among lower-income families 
will remain at high levels. In the best and worst cases, 
those in families with incomes less than 200 percent of the 
FPL will continue to have high uninsurance rates of 33 to  
34 percent. Uninsurance rates are stable as eligible individuals 
increasingly shift to public coverage. This assumes that states 
maintain Medicaid eligibility at current levels. 
  »  A larger share of the uninsured will come from  
middle- and higher-income families. As a result of the 
pattern of uninsurance rate increases, in the worst case more 
than half the uninsured (53 percent) will have incomes of 
more than 200 percent of the FPL in 2020, whereas such 
families currently comprise an estimated 44 percent of 
the uninsured. Even in the best case, the uninsured will 
increasingly consist of middle and higher-income Americans. 
Being mostly ineligible for Medicaid or CHIP, middle-  
and higher-income families who lose private coverage  
would become uninsured, whereas many eligible lower-
income individuals would obtain coverage through  
Medicaid or CHIP.
2010 Baseline 2020 Best Case 2020 Worst Case
N Percent of uninsured
Uninsured 
rate N
Percent of 
uninsured
Uninsured 
rate N
Percent of 
uninsured
Uninsured 
rate
Income Group
<200% FPL 27.8 56% 34% 30.9 53% 34% 31.8 47% 33%
200-399% FPL 13.8 28% 19% 16.3 28% 23% 21.1 31% 28%
>400% FPL 7.8 16% 7% 10.7 19% 9% 14.7 22% 13%
Age Group
0 - 18 7.5 15% 9% 8.9 15% 10% 10.7 16% 12%
19 - 24 9.3 19% 35% 10.5 18% 39% 10.8 16% 40%
25 - 34 10.8 22% 28% 12.4 21% 30% 13.9 21% 33%
35 - 44 9.1 18% 21% 10.8 19% 23% 12.7 19% 27%
45 - 54 7.8 16% 17% 9.4 16% 19% 11.9 18% 24%
55 - 64 4.8 10% 15% 6.0 10% 18% 7.6 11% 22%
Health Status
Excellent/Very Good/Good Health 43.7 88% 18% 52.0 90% 20% 61.4 91% 24%
Fair/Poor Health 5.7 12% 22% 5.9 10% 22% 6.2 9% 22%
Total 49.4 100% — 57.9 100% — 67.6 100% —
Source:  Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
Table 3: Changes in the Composition of the Uninsured (Nonelderly Population, in Millions)
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  »  Uninsured rates will be higher for individuals of every 
age, with steep rises for adults age 45 and over. The 
uninsured rate for adults age 45 to 54 would increase from 
17 percent in 2010 to 19 percent in 2020 in the best case 
and 24 percent in the worst case. For adults age 55 to 64, 
the uninsured rate would increase from 15 percent in 2010 
to 18 percent in the best case and 22 percent in the worst 
case in 2020. While the value of health insurance increases 
as people get older, many over age 45 would lose access to 
coverage through their employers while nongroup premiums 
would become increasingly unaffordable. For children age 
18 and below, Medicaid and CHIP would limit the rise in 
uninsurance rates to a 3 percentage point increase in ten years 
in the worst case.
  »  The uninsured population will shift somewhat toward 
older age groups. Young adults age 19 to 24 have the 
highest rate of uninsurance in each year and scenario. They 
will, however, become a smaller share of the uninsured 
population in 2020 in both the best and worst cases. The 
share of uninsured age 35 to 64 will be higher in 2020 in the 
worst case, with only minor changes in the best case.
  »  Uninsured rates will rise for those in better health. 
Among people in excellent, very good, or good health, the 
uninsured rate would rise from 18 percent in 2010 to 20 
percent in the best case and 24 percent in the worst case. 
Currently, those in fair or poor health are more likely to be 
uninsured than those in better health. Among people in fair 
or poor health, the uninsured rate would remain fairly stable 
over time at 22 percent. This is because those with higher 
health care needs who currently have coverage would be more 
likely to continue their coverage as premiums increase. As a 
result, those continuing to have private health insurance will 
be an increasingly less healthy population in 2020. 
Changes in Premiums and Offer Rates  
of Employer-Sponsored Insurance
Table 4 shows projected average single and family premiums for 
employer-sponsored coverage in 2010 and in 2020 under both 
the best and worst case scenarios. Average total premiums are 
reported, summing the portions paid by employer and employee. 
The table also reports projections of the percent of workers 
who are offered health insurance benefits by their employers, 
separately by firm size.
  »  Premiums will become increasingly expensive for 
employers and their workers. In the worst case, premiums 
for both single and family policies more than double by 2020, 
increasing from $4,800 to $10,300 for the single policy and 
from $12,100 to $25,600 for family policies.11 Even in the 
best case scenario, there is a large increase in the price of both 
policies by 2020 with single policy premiums rising to $7,800 
and family policy premiums rising to $19,500. Premium 
growth would greatly exceed growth in incomes. The median 
income for families who continue to have ESI would increase 
from $68,100 in 2010 to $75,500 in the worst case and 
$81,400 in the best case in 2020.
  »  Offer rates will fall significantly for workers in small 
and medium firms. As premiums more than double, small 
firm workers would see offer rates almost cut in half by 2020 
in the worst case scenario, dropping from 41 percent of 
workers with offers to 23 percent. Medium firm workers fare 
a bit better, but still see a significant decline in offer rates, 
dropping from 90 percent in 2010 to 75 percent in 2020. 
The declines in offer rates are less dramatic in the best case 
scenario, but by 2020 there is still significant erosion in the 
offer rates for workers in small and medium firms. 
2010 Baseline 2020 Best Case 2020 Worst Case
Total ESI premiums
Single policy $4,800 $7,800 $10,300
Family policy $12,100 $19,500 $25,600
Percent of workers offered ESI
Small firms (1-49) 41.4% 33.4% 22.7%
Medium firms (50-999) 90.0% 84.7% 74.8%
Large firms (1000+) 99.1% 99.1% 97.9%
Source:  Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
Table 4: Premiums and Offer Rates of Employer-Sponsored Insurance (Nonelderly Population)
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  »  Large firms will mostly continue offering coverage,  
but the burden of that coverage will rise. Offer rates 
for workers in large firms hold steady at 99 percent in the  
best case but fall slightly to 98 percent in the worst case. 
However, as noted above, premiums will increase considerably 
by 2020 in both cases, thus increasing the economic burden 
of employer coverage. Rising health insurance costs will limit 
potential wage increases for these workers.
Growth in Health Care Spending
Table 5 shows estimates of changes in spending by different 
payers in the health care system. Results are presented for each  
of the three scenarios.
  »  Large increases in state and federal Medicaid and CHIP 
spending. Medicaid and CHIP expenditures on acute care 
services for the nonelderly would grow substantially both 
because of increased enrollment and because of higher health 
care costs. In the worst case, Medicaid and CHIP spending 
for the nonelderly would increase from $278 billion in 2010 
to $576 billion in 2020, an increase of 108 percent. In the best 
case, spending would increase by 59 percent to $442 billion. 
This assumes states maintain current eligibility levels. If they 
do not, Medicaid enrollment and spending will be lower but 
the uncompensated care costs cited below will be higher.
  »  Much higher uncompensated care costs. In the worst 
case, the cost of uncompensated care would increase by 119 
percent, from $64 billion in 2010 to $140 billion in 2020. In 
the best case, the cost of uncompensated care would increase 
by 74 percent and total $111 billion in 2020. Together with 
the increased spending for Medicaid and CHIP, this would 
inevitably mean higher federal, state, and local taxes even 
without reform.
  »  Large increases in employer spending. Under all three 
scenarios there would be substantial increases in employer 
premium spending, despite deceases in ESI coverage. We 
estimate that employer spending on premiums would increase 
from $430 billion in 2010 to $851 billion in 2020 in the worst 
case and $719 billion in the best case.12 Employer spending 
would increase even more if employers continued  
to offer coverage at the same rate they do now.
  »  Higher health care costs for families. Individual and 
family spending on premiums and out-of-pocket health care 
costs would increase significantly—from $315 billion in 2010 
to $564 billion in 2020 in the worst case and to $471 billion 
in the best case due to higher premium and out-of-pocket 
health care costs.
2010 2015
% change 
2010-2015
2020
% change 
2015-2020
% change 
2010-2020
Worst Case
Medicaid/SCHIP $278 $403 45.1% $576 43.1% 107.6%
Uncompensated Costs $64 $97 52.3% $140 43.5% 118.5%
Employer $430 $608 41.5% $851 40.0% 98.1%
Individual and Family $315 $422 34.1% $564 33.6% 79.2%
Intermediate Case
Medicaid/SCHIP $278 $375 35.0% $509 35.7% 83.2%
Uncompensated Costs $64 $90 41.4% $121 33.6% 88.9%
Employer $430 $596 38.6% $820 37.6% 90.8%
Individual and Family $315 $408 29.6% $529 29.6% 68.0%
Best Case
Medicaid/SCHIP $278 $353 27.2% $442 25.2% 59.3%
Uncompensated Costs $64 $84 31.6% $111 32.1% 73.9%
Employer $430 $560 30.3% $719 28.4% 67.3%
Individual and Family $315 $387 22.8% $471 21.8% 49.6%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
Table 5: Aggregate Health Care Spending Across Years for the Nonelderly Population (in Billions)
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Conclusion
Without significant reform that makes health insurance more 
accessible and affordable while reducing the rate of health care 
cost growth over time, the number of uninsured and health 
care spending would both increase dramatically. The ranks of 
the uninsured would increasingly be filled with middle-income, 
higher-income, and older individuals who have coverage now. 
Medicaid enrollment would increase because of the erosion of 
private coverage. Costs per enrollee would also increase because 
of medical care inflation. As a result, the cost of financing 
public programs would place added burden on taxpayers. The 
rising cost of caring for a growing number of uninsured persons 
through safety net programs would also add to taxpayer burdens. 
Employers would face sharply increasing health care premiums 
and as a result, many small and medium-sized firms would  
stop offering coverage. For employers who still offer coverage, 
these additional costs would be passed onto workers as lower 
wages over time. In the short-term, business profitability for 
those who still offer coverage would be adversely affected. 
Finally, individuals and families would face higher out-of-pocket 
costs for premiums and health care services, along with higher 
tax burdens.
We recognize that health reform itself would also be costly. If 
reforms like those recently passed by the House and Senate are 
enacted, government expenditures would increase more than 
they would without reform because of increases in Medicaid 
eligibility and enrollment and subsidies to low-income people. 
Increases in Medicaid spending would be tempered because there 
would be less erosion of private insurance and coverage would be 
available through the exchanges. Spending on uncompensated 
care for the uninsured would also fall. The increases in 
government expenditure would also be affected by the cost 
containment provisions ultimately enacted. Employer spending 
would also grow under reform, though it should be lower for 
small firms who have access to exchanges and tax credits. 
Comprehensive health reform would stem the continuous 
erosion in the number of Americans with health care coverage 
and make coverage more affordable for a large number of lower-
income families. Reform would also decrease financial pressures 
on the hospitals and clinics that provide care to the uninsured, 
reduce many system inefficiencies, and ultimately improve the 
health and financial security of Americans. While enacting 
health reform will be difficult and expensive, the cost of failure 
is also high and probably unsustainable.
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